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BSTRACT
 
Background
 
From June 30, 1998, through March
21, 1999, several patients in the surgical intensive
care unit of a hospital acquired 
 
Serratia marcescens
 
bacteremia. We investigated this outbreak. 
 
Methods
 
A case was defined as the occurrence of
 
S. marcescens
 
 bacteremia in any patient in the sur-
gical intensive care unit during the period of the ep-
idemic. To identify risk factors, we compared patients
with 
 
S. marcescens 
 
bacteremia with randomly select-
ed controls. Isolates from patients and from medica-
tions were evaluated by pulsed-field gel electrophore-
sis. The hair of one employee was tested for fentanyl.
 
Results
 
Twenty-six patients with 
 
S. marcescens
 
bacteremia were identified; eight (31 percent) had
polymicrobial bacteremia, and seven of these had
 
Enterobacter cloacae
 
 and 
 
S. marcescens
 
 in the same
culture. According to univariate analysis, patients with
 
S. marcescens 
 
bacteremia stayed in the surgical in-
tensive care unit longer than controls (13.5 vs. 4.0
days, P<0.001), were more likely to have received
fentanyl in the surgical intensive care unit (odds ra-
tio, 31; P<0.001), and were more likely to have been
exposed to two particular respiratory therapists (odds
ratios, 13.1 and 5.1; P<0.001 for both comparisons).
In a multivariate analysis, receipt of fentanyl and ex-
posure to the two respiratory therapists (adjusted odds
ratio for one therapist, 6.7; P=0.002; adjusted odds ra-
tio for the other therapist, 9.5; P=0.02) remained signif-
icant. One respiratory therapist had been reported for
tampering with fentanyl; his hair sample tested posi-
tive for fentanyl. Cultures of fentanyl infusions from
two case patients yielded 
 
S. marcescens
 
 and 
 
E. cloa-
cae. 
 
The isolates from the case patients and from the
fentanyl infusions had similar patterns on pulsed-field
gel electrophoresis. After removal of the implicated
respiratory therapist, no further cases occurred.
 
Conclusions
 
An outbreak of 
 
S. marcescens
 
 and
 
E.
 
 
 
cloacae
 
 bacteremia in a surgical intensive care unit
was traced to extrinsic contamination of the parenter-
al narcotic fentanyl by a health care worker. Our find-
ings underscore the risk of complications in patients
that is associated with illicit narcotic use by health
care workers. (N Engl J Med 2002;346:1529-37.)
 
Copyright © 2002 Massachusetts Medical Society.
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ERRATIA MARCESCENS
 
 has been impli-
cated as a pathogen in a large array of infec-
tions.
 
1 
 
Nosocomial 
 
S. marcescens
 
 outbreaks have
been associated with contaminated equipment,
such as transducers
 
2,3
 
 and bronchoscopic equipment
 
4
 
;
contaminated fluids and cleaning solutions
 
5-7
 
; contam-
inated hands or fingernails of employees
 
8
 
; and a re-
duced nurse-to-patient ratio.
 
9
 
From June 30 through September 30, 1998, nine
cases of 
 
S. marcescens
 
 bacteremia were detected in
the surgical intensive care unit of a 455-bed tertiary
care facility. Because of the rarity of serratia species
in clinical specimens and the similar antimicrobial-
susceptibility patterns in these cases, eight of the nine
isolates were sent to a secondary laboratory for geno-
typing. When the laboratory was unable to determine
the genotype of the isolates, they were sent to the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
for pulsed-field gel electrophoresis, which showed
that seven of the eight isolates had indistinguishable
patterns. From October 1, 1998, to March 11, 1999,
16 more patients acquired 
 
S. marcescens
 
 bacteremia,
and the CDC was invited to assist in the investiga-
tion of this outbreak. After our investigation began,
a 26th patient was found to have 
 
S. marcescens
 
 bac-
teremia. The objectives of our investigation were to
define the extent of the problem, identify the source
and risk factors, and implement control measures.
 
METHODS
 
Determination of Trends over Time
 
We reviewed the hospital’s microbiology records for bloodstream
infections caused by serratia species and other gram-negative bac-
teria from July 1996 through March 1999; we then compared the
rates of bacteremia during the epidemic period (from June 30,
1998, through March 21, 1999) and before the epidemic period
(from July 1, 1996, through June 29, 1998). Serratia species isolat-
ed from tissues other than blood during the epidemic period also
were reviewed.
S
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Definition and Ascertainment of Cases
 
A case was defined as any instance of 
 
S. marcescens
 
 bacteremia
in a patient in the hospital’s surgical intensive care unit that was
diagnosed during the epidemic period. Cases were identified by
review of infection-control, microbiologic, and medical records.
 
Case–Control Study
 
To identify which patients in the surgical intensive care unit
were at risk for 
 
S. marcescens
 
 bacteremia, we compared patients
with such bacteremia (case patients) with randomly selected con-
trols (patients who stayed in the hospital’s surgical intensive care
unit for at least 48 hours during the epidemic period without ac-
quiring gram-negative bacteremia). Factors assessed included dem-
ographic and clinical characteristics of the patients and exposure
to devices, procedures, and medications. The severity of illness was
assessed by means of the Acute Physiology and Chronic Health
Evaluation (APACHE II) score,
 
10
 
 determined within 24 hours af-
ter admission to the surgical intensive care unit. To assess exposure
to health care workers, we determined which physicians, nurses, and
respiratory therapists had contact with case patients and controls
as documented by their signatures in the medical records. Data on
exposure were collected for case patients from the time of admis-
sion to the surgical intensive care unit until the diagnosis of the
 
S. marcescens
 
 bacteremia. Exposure data for controls were collected
from the time of admission to the surgical intensive care unit up
to the median length of stay at which 
 
S. marcescens
 
 bacteremia was
diagnosed in the case patients (seven days), or until discharge from
the surgical intensive care unit, if the control stayed in the unit for
less than seven days.
 
Review of Procedures and Microbiologic Studies
 
We reviewed pharmacy procedures and infection-control policies
and practices in the surgical intensive care unit and respiratory-ther-
apy areas.
 
S. marcescens 
 
isolates from case patients were sent to the CDC
for species confirmation, antimicrobial-susceptibility testing, and
pulsed-field gel electrophoresis by standard methods.
 
11
 
 On March
17, 1999, tracheal or urinary cultures were obtained from all patients
in the surgical intensive care unit to identify those with colonization.
Prior environmental cultures performed by hospital personnel were
reviewed. Water samples from the rooms in which case patients had
stayed, the offices of the surgical intensive care unit and the respira-
tory-therapy area, the nursing stations of the surgical intensive care
unit, and the restrooms in the vicinity of the surgical intensive care
unit were sent to the CDC for processing.
 
12
 
 Cultures of medications
infused at the time of onset of symptoms in the case patients were
obtained and processed in the hospital’s microbiology laboratory.
Medication bags used for selected patients were forwarded to the
CDC for additional testing. Cultures were obtained from unopened
bottles or vials of selected medications and from the hands of a sam-
ple of health care workers by the hand-wipe method.
 
13
 
Statistical Analysis
 
Data were collected on standardized forms and analyzed with use
of Epi Info software (version 6.03, CDC) and SAS software (version
6.12, SAS Institute). The rates of bacteremia before and during
the epidemic period were compared by the chi-square test. For the
case–control study, categorical and continuous variables were com-
pared with use of appropriate univariate tests. Odds ratios and 95
percent confidence intervals were calculated. Multivariate logistic-
regression analyses were performed in which all variables that were
significant (P<0.05) in univariate analysis were included.
 
RESULTS
 
Trends over Time in the Rate of 
 
S. marcescens
 
 Bacteremia
 
The hospital-wide rate of 
 
S. marcescens
 
 bacteremia
was significantly higher during the epidemic than
before the epidemic (0.43 vs. 0.028 infection per
1000 patient-days, P<0.001). 
 
S. marcescens
 
 was sig-
nificantly more likely to be isolated from patients in
the surgical intensive care unit than from other pa-
tients (6.2 vs. 0.06 isolates per 1000 patient-days,
P<0.001). The rates of 
 
S. marcescens
 
 bacteremia in
areas other than the surgical intensive care unit were
similar during and before the epidemic (0.02 vs. 0.06
infection per 1000 patient-days, P=0.2). In contrast,
the rate of 
 
S. marcescens
 
 bacteremia in the surgical in-
tensive care unit was significantly higher during the
epidemic than before it (8.1 vs. 0.1 isolates per 1000
catheterization-days, P<0.001). Only 10 serratia iso-
lates from sources other than blood or catheters were
identified during the epidemic period; 3 of these were
obtained from case patients after bacteremia had been
identified.
 
Identification and Characteristics of Patients 
with 
 
S. marcescens
 
 Bacteremia
 
Twenty-six patients with 
 
S. marcescens
 
 bacteremia
were identified during the epidemic period (Fig. 1).
The median length of stay in the surgical intensive
care unit before a positive blood culture was obtained
was 7 days (range, 2 to 26). Seventeen of these pa-
tients were male (65 percent); the mean age of the
patients was 48.2 years (range, 17 to 87). Of the 26
cases of bacteremia, 8 (31 percent) were polymicro-
bial, in 7 of which (27 percent) 
 
Enterobacter cloacae
 
was identified in the same culture as 
 
S. marcescens,
 
and 13 (50 percent) were persistent (
 
S. marcescens
 
 was
identified in blood cultures on two or three different
dates over a range of two to nine days). Eleven pa-
tients (42 percent) were receiving antimicrobial agents
to which the 
 
S. marcescens
 
 isolate was susceptible at
the time the positive blood culture was obtained. In
contrast, 11 cases of polymicrobial bacteremia were
detected during the epidemic period; only 3 did not
include serratia species.
 
Case–Control Study
 
In a univariate analysis, case and control patients
were similar in terms of sex, age, the proportion un-
dergoing surgery, the proportion requiring mechani-
cal ventilation, the proportion requiring respiratory
therapy, the proportion with exposure to fentanyl
anywhere in the hospital, and mortality. Patients with
 
S. marcescens
 
 bacteremia were significantly more likely
than controls to have been admitted because of trau-
ma; to have a longer stay in the surgical intensive care
unit, a higher median temperature, or rigors; to have
undergone bronchoscopy; and to have received a
blood transfusion or fentanyl, particularly as a con-
tinuous infusion, in the surgical intensive care unit
(Table 1). The median number of days of continu-
ous fentanyl infusion and the median total dose were
higher for case patients than for controls. Further-
The New England Journal of Medicine 
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more, in 17 case patients (65 percent), the blood
culture that yielded 
 
S. marcescens
 
 was collected while
they were receiving a fentanyl infusion or within 24
hours after they had received a fentanyl infusion.
 
Background of Personnel
 
Three types of health care workers had substantial
contact with patients in the surgical intensive care
unit: physicians, nurses, and respiratory therapists. A
single surgical team provided care for most of the pa-
tients in the surgical intensive care unit, and several
subspecialty services assisted. Designated surgical in-
tensive care unit nurses were not permanently assigned
to a particular station. Eight respiratory therapists were
assigned to the surgical intensive care unit, and nu-
merous other respiratory therapists (more than 30)
cared for patients in the surgical intensive care unit as
well as other patients.
Univariate analyses indicated that several health
care workers were associated with a patient’s having
 
S. marcescens
 
 bacteremia (Table 1). One physician
(Physician 5) was significantly associated with such
bacteremia; however, he had recorded contact with
only 15 of the 26 case patients. No nurse had record-
ed contact with more than 10 case patients. Among
the respiratory therapists, five were significantly as-
sociated with bacteremia. One respiratory therapist
(designated Respiratory Therapist 18) had document-
ed contact with 23 of 26 case patients (88 percent).
Furthermore, Respiratory Therapist 18 worked with-
in 48 hours before a positive culture was obtained in
two of three case patients with no contact docu-
mented by their individual medical records.
Analysis of data on the health care workers was
complicated, because many different employees pro-
vided care to any given patient throughout the pa-
tient’s hospital stay, and even within one hospital day.
This was particularly true of the respiratory thera-
pists (Fig. 2).
In multivariate analyses, only receipt of a contin-
uous fentanyl infusion and receipt of care from Res-
piratory Therapist 18 or Respiratory Therapist 3 were
independent risk factors for 
 
S. marcescens
 
 bactere-
mia. Furthermore, when we performed multivariate
analyses including only the 25 case patients and 24
controls who received continuous fentanyl infusions,
receipt of care from Respiratory Therapist 18 or
Respiratory Therapist 3 remained independent risk
factors for 
 
S. marcescens
 
 bacteremia (Table 2).
Independently of our investigation, a report was
filed at the hospital by a nurse in the surgical intensive
care unit who witnessed Respiratory Therapist 18 ma-
nipulating intravenous infusions (including fentanyl)
at the bedside of a patient on two occasions. She ob-
served Respiratory Therapist 18 crouched down by
the bedside (far from the ventilator) holding a nee-
dle. Both incidents involved a single patient (Patient
24), samples of whose fentanyl infusion grew clonal
 
Figure 1.
 
 Distribution of Cases of 
 
Serratia marcescens 
 
Bacteremia from January 1, 1997, to April 30, 1999.
Hatched blocks indicate patients with polymicrobial bacteremia.
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strains of serratia and enterobacter species when cul-
tured. Subsequently, Respiratory Therapist 18 agreed
to testing of hair samples for fentanyl. Hair samples
collected by personnel from the hospital on March
26, 1999, and sent to an independent laboratory
were positive for fentanyl.
 
14,15
 
 Respiratory Therapist
18 was placed on administrative leave and his hospi-
tal employment was subsequently terminated. The
26th case was diagnosed within three days after this
employee’s removal, and no additional cases have
been identified in the more than two years since he
left the hospital.
 
Microbiologic and Molecular Studies
 
Our March 17, 1999, surveillance cultures identi-
fied 
 
S. marcescens 
 
in only 1 of 22 patients who were
then in the surgical intensive care unit. In addition,
more than 50 environmental cultures performed by
hospital staff during the epidemic period were neg-
ative for serratia species, as were all 19 water samples.
Samples of intravenous infusions administered to
two patients were recovered at the time of the onset
of symptoms of bacteremia. 
 
S. marcescens
 
 and 
 
E. cloa-
cae
 
 were isolated from cultures of the fentanyl infu-
sions of one patient (Patient 21). Cultures of the do-
pamine infusion given during the same period to
this patient were sterile. Fentanyl-infusion cultures
from the second patient (Patient 24), who had doc-
umented bacteremia with both 
 
S. marcescens
 
 and
 
E. cloacae,
 
 yielded 
 
E. cloacae
 
 at the hospital microbi-
ology laboratory and 
 
E. cloacae
 
 and 
 
S. marcescens 
 
at
the CDC. A review of the Food and Drug Admin-
 
*CI denotes confidence interval, SICU surgical intensive care unit, RT respiratory therapist, and
APACHE II Acute Physiology and Chronic Health Evaluation.
†The odds ratio could not be determined.
 
T
 
ABLE
 
 1. 
 
P
 
OTENTIAL
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ISK
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ACTORS
 
 
 
IN
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ATIENTS
 
 
 
WITH
 
 
 
SERRATIA MARCESCENS 
BACTEREMIA AND CONTROLS FROM JUNE 30, 1998, THROUGH MARCH 21, 1999.*
POTENTIAL RISK FACTOR
PATIENTS WITH
BACTEREMIA
(N=26)
CONTROL
PATIENTS
(N=65)
ODDS RATIO
(95% CI) P VALUE
Categorical variables
Patient characteristics or symptoms — no. (%)
Trauma
Fever
Rigors
Death
16 (62)
26 (100)
4 (15)
3 (12)
14 (22)
53 (82)
1 (2)
2 (3)
5.8 (1.9–17.9)
—†
11.6 (1.1–294)
4.1 (0.5–38.6)
<0.001
0.02
0.02
0.13
Exposures — no. (%)
Procedures or devices
Bronchoscopy
Transfusion
Respiratory therapy
11 (42)
26 (100)
26 (100)
4 (6)
52 (80)
62 (95)
11.2 (2.7–50)
—†
—†
<0.001
0.02
0.55
Medications — no. (%)
Fentanyl anywhere in hospital
Fentanyl in SICU
Continuous fentanyl infusion in SICU
Lorazepam in SICU
26 (100)
25 (96)
25 (96)
18 (69)
59 (91)
29 (45)
24 (37)
22 (34)
—†
31 (3.8–637)
42 (5.3–893)
4.4 (1.5–13.3)
0.18
<0.001
<0.001
0.002
Personnel — no. (%)
Physician 5
RT 18
RT 3
RT 16
RT 11
RT 13
15 (58)
23 (88)
18 (69)
19 (73)
19 (73)
19 (73)
12 (18)
24 (37)
20 (31)
21 (32)
25 (38)
32 (49)
6.0 (2.0–18.8)
13.1 (3.2–62)
5.1 (1.7–15.5)
5.7 (1.9–18.0)
4.3 (1.4–13.5)
2.8 (0.9–8.6)
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
0.003
0.04
Continuous variables
Length of SICU stay — days
Median
Range
13.5
3–40
4.0
2–45
<0.001
APACHE II score
Median
Range
18.0
9–30
14.0
4–28
0.09
Continuous fentanyl infusion
Total dose — µg
No. of days
Median
Range
27,979
5
2–27
6100
2
1–7
<0.001
<0.001
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istration Adverse Event Reporting System data base
failed to identify reports of intrinsic contamination of
this product from July 1998 through March 1999.
Cultures of unopened fentanyl ampules were sterile.
Of the 25 S. marcescens isolates from case patients
that were sent to the CDC, 24 had similar patterns
on pulsed-field gel electrophoresis. One case patient
had an isolate with a unique pattern; this patient was
the only one who did not receive continuous fentanyl
in the surgical intensive care unit. The S. marcescens
isolates cultured from fentanyl infusions administered
to Patients 21 and 24 were indistinguishable from
their blood isolates (Fig. 3A). All seven E. cloacae iso-
lates from case patients and fentanyl-infusion isolates
from Patients 21 and 24 were indistinguishable (Fig.
3B). Cultures from the hands of three hospital em-
ployees, including Respiratory Therapist 18, were neg-
ative for S. marcescens and E. cloacae.
DISCUSSION
Fentanyl, an opiate narcotic approximately 80 times
as potent as morphine, has been used as an illicit
drug.16-18 Our investigation implicated fentanyl in-
fused continuously in the surgical intensive care unit
as the source of bacteremia. Numerous data identified
Respiratory Therapist 18 as the most likely source of
the extrinsic contamination. He was the respiratory
therapist with the strongest association with patients
who had bacteremia. Independently of our investiga-
tion, there were reports of probable tampering with
fentanyl by Respiratory Therapist 18. In addition, a
hair sample from Respiratory Therapist 18 contained
fentanyl, documenting recent ingestion, injection,
or infusion of fentanyl. After the removal of Respi-
ratory Therapist 18, there were no further cases of
S. marcescens bacteremia.
Another respiratory therapist routinely assigned to
the surgical intensive care unit, Respiratory Therapist
3, was identified as associated with S. marcescens bac-
teremia in patients. However, eight case patients’
medical records had been signed by Respiratory
Therapist 18 but not by Respiratory Therapist 3. Af-
ter our analysis, we recommended to the hospital
personnel that hair from this respiratory therapist
and from other respiratory therapists significantly as-
sociated (P<0.05 by univariate analysis) with the
cases of S. marcescens bacteremia be tested for fenta-
nyl. The hospital chose not to pursue further test-
Figure 2. Exposure of 26 Case Patients to Respiratory Therapists.
Each circle indicates the number of patients with S. marcescens bacteremia in whose charts a respiratory therapist’s signature was
identified. The comparisons are for five respiratory therapists (designated 3, 11, 13, 16, and 18) associated with bacteremia in the
univariate analyses.
Respiratory
Therapist 3
Respiratory
Therapist 18
3 815
Respiratory
Therapist 11
Respiratory
Therapist 18
2 617
Respiratory
Therapist 13
Respiratory
Therapist 18
3 716
Respiratory
Therapist 16
Respiratory
Therapist 18
3 716
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ing, mainly because new cases had ceased to appear
by that time. Thus, we cannot exclude the possibility
that Respiratory Therapist 3 may have been an ac-
complice of Respiratory Therapist 18 or may have
committed similar acts. However, we are unaware of
any evidence implicating any respiratory therapist
except Respiratory Therapist 18 in fentanyl tamper-
ing, and no further cases occurred, despite the pres-
ence of Respiratory Therapist 3 after the removal of
Respiratory Therapist 18.
Respiratory Therapist 18 was implicated in the
contamination of fentanyl, but it is uncertain how
the fentanyl became contaminated. Despite repeated
interviews by hospital personnel, Respiratory Ther-
apist 18 never admitted illicit-drug use or theft. We
hypothesize that reuse of needles to remove fentanyl
may have led to inadvertent contamination. Another
possibility is that a liquid was used as replacement
for fentanyl after the theft of the drug to replace the
missing volume of narcotic in the patients’ infusion
bags. Despite a search of the surgical intensive care
unit and the related environment for devices or wa-
ter sources that could have been used in the theft of
fentanyl, no reservoir could be identified. A third
possibility is that fentanyl became contaminated dur-
ing manipulation by the implicated employee’s hands.
Cultures collected from the hands of Respiratory
Therapist 18 were negative for serratia species and
enterobacter species; however, Respiratory Therapist
18 was warned that he would be tested.
It remains unclear how Respiratory Therapist 18
used fentanyl. His arms had no needle tracks, but he
could have injected fentanyl into another area of his
body. Fentanyl is used preoperatively as an oral agent
to supplement anesthesia19; an operating room super-
visor’s dependence on fentanyl has been reported to
be associated with oral ingestion.20
Bacteremia associated with extrinsic contamination
of a narcotic by a health care worker has been de-
scribed previously. In 1991, Maki et al. described sev-
eral Ralstonia pickettii (formerly known as Pseudomo-
nas pickettii) infections related to contamination of
fentanyl.21 A pharmacist resigned in conjunction
with this incident.
Theft of narcotics and the potential for resulting
complications in patients remain a problem in health
care settings. The episode described here might ini-
tially appear to be an isolated event related to poor
judgment on the part of an employee. However, this
outbreak persisted for more than nine months, with
a large group of hospitalized patients potentially at
risk. We are aware of another report of the theft of
narcotics used in intravenous infusions22,23 (and un-
published data). Although these cases were not asso-
ciated with bacteremia, one episode received wide at-
tention in the media because of concern about the
possible spread of hepatitis B or hepatitis C virus.22,23
Estimates based on the 1991–1993 National
Household Survey on Drug Abuse indicate that 4.2
percent of hospital workers acknowledge current il-
licit-drug use, and 8.9 percent of workers report
previous illicit-drug use.24 In a survey of anesthesia
training programs in the United States, 214 (74 per-
cent) had at least one report of illicit-drug use by a
trainee or an instructor.25
In our investigation, hair testing documented fen-
*CI denotes confidence interval, SICU surgical intensive care unit, and RT respiratory therapist.
†Percentages are based on 26 case patients and 65 control patients.
‡Percentages are based on 25 case patients and 24 control patients.
TABLE 2. RESULTS OF MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF RISK FACTORS 
FOR SERRATIA MARCESCENS BACTEREMIA, FROM JUNE 30, 1998, 
THROUGH MARCH 21, 1999.*
EXPOSURE
CASE 
PATIENTS
CONTROL 
PATIENTS
ODDS RATIO
(95% CI) P VALUE
no. (%)
All patients†
Continuous fentanyl infusion in SICU
RT 18
RT 3
25 (96)
23 (88)
18 (69)
24 (37)
24 (37)
20 (31)
44.3 (4.7–421.8)
6.7 (1.4–31.6)
9.5 (2.3–39.0)
0.001
0.002
0.02
Patients receiving continuous fentanyl 
infusion in SICU‡
RT 18
RT 3
23 (92)
17 (68)
11 (46)
4 (17)
11.1 (1.9–68.7)
8.9 (1.9–40.7)
0.009
0.005
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tanyl abuse by the implicated health care worker,
who denied such abuse. Hair testing can detect drug
exposure over a longer period than testing of blood
or urine.14,15 Head hair grows about 1 cm (0.4 in.)
per month, so a hair sample 10 to 13 cm (4 to 5 in.)
long can supply evidence of a subject’s drug use in
approximately the previous 10 months. Hair-testing
results are accepted by courts for prosecution pur-
poses.14,15,26 Thorough washing of the hair sample
helps eliminate false positive results that might be pro-
duced by environmental contamination. Moreover,
thorough review of respiratory-therapy procedures
and procedures in the surgical intensive care unit
confirmed that respiratory therapists did not have
responsibility for narcotics and should not have had
contact with needles or narcotic infusions.
Our investigation identified a number of contro-
versies surrounding drug use by health care workers.
Although the hospital had a policy that theft of nar-
cotics should be investigated, there were no adequate
mechanisms in place to deal with theft of patients’
medications or possible resulting adverse events. The
report of the CDC (a nonregulatory agency), includ-
ing a recommendation to notify any respiratory-thera-
py regulatory agency, was sent to the hospital admin-
istration and the state health department. Additional
Figure 3. Pulsed-Field Gel Electrophoresis of Bacterial Isolates.
Panel A shows Serratia marcescens isolates. The lanes are as follows: l, ladder DNA size marker; 1 to 3, S. marcescens isolates
from a cluster of three infections that occurred more than one year before the outbreak; 4 to 6, Patients 2, 3, and 4 (identified early
in the outbreak); 7 to 9, Patients 18, 19, and 20 (identified later in the outbreak); 10 and 11, isolates from blood and from fentanyl
infusion in Patient 21; 12 and 13, isolates from blood and from fentanyl infusion in Patient 24; 14 and 15, catheter-tip and peritoneal
isolates recovered from other unrelated patients after termination of the outbreak.
In Panel B (next page), Enterobacter cloacae isolates from seven patients with polymicrobial bacteremia are compared. The lanes
are as follows: l, ladder DNA size marker; 1 to 7, seven blood isolates from case patients (the isolate in lane 7 is from Patient 24);
and 8 and 9, isolates recovered from fentanyl infusions in Patients 24 and 21.
l 1 2
776 —
kb
582 —
436 —
388 —
339 —
291 —
242 —
194 —
145 —
97 —
48 —
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 lA
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legal and ethical responsibilities of the hospital were
addressed by its administration and legal counsel.
The case was presented by a hospital official to the
area district attorney, but legal action was not pur-
sued because of insufficient evidence.
We are indebted to the infection-control, microbiology, adminis-
trative, and clinical staff of the hospital for their extensive assistance
in our investigation of this outbreak.
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